Extant studies provide two additional explanations other than backdating for the abnormal stock returns around CEO option grants -timing of option grants and timing of corporate disclosures. We examine the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the stock option backdating scandal, and the new compensation disclosure rules of 2006 on these opportunistic timing behaviors. We find no evidence of opportunistic timing relative to scheduled option grants in the pre-SOX, post-SOX, and post-Scandal periods. However, timing behaviors for unscheduled option grants persist in the post-SOX period. In addition, we distinguish timing of option grants from timing of news disclosures by categorizing earnings announcements into fixed and variable dates and find the persistence of both behaviors. We also analyze option grants to independent directors and find no evidence of timing behaviors in all three sample periods. Overall, our results suggest that, while SOX mitigates backdating, it does not affect opportunistic timing behaviors related to CEO option grants, however, the backdating scandal combined with the subsequent compensation disclosure rules have deterred these behaviors. JEL Classification: M41; M52; K22; G38
Introduction
Economic theory predicts that managers often act strategically and in their best interests.
Extant studies in finance and accounting literature document that abnormal stock returns are negative before CEO stock option grants and positive afterward. This asymmetric trough pattern of stock returns is attributed to three types of opportunistic behavior: (1) opportunistic timing of option grants relative to future anticipated stock returns (Yermack 1997) , (2) opportunistic timing of corporate disclosures around option grants (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy 2001) , and (3) backdating of option grant dates (Lie 2005; Narayanan and Seyhun 2008) .
To maximize their compensation, managers may have a pecking order based on the potential costs associated with each behavior. Option backdating, which could be at the top of the pecking order, has received a great deal of attention from regulators, academics, and the public. Heron and Lie (2009) estimate that 13.6% of option grants to top executives from 1996 to 2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated. This estimate indicates that opportunistic behaviors are widespread although only a small set of firms were implicated for backdating practice. It also raises interesting questions: Do opportunistic timing behaviors (both (1) and (2)) co-exist with backdating? Have the disclosure-related regulations affected the use of such timing? In this study, we attempt to address these questions by examining the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereinafter SOX), option grant backdating scandal, and subsequent executive compensation disclosure rules on these opportunistic behaviors.
The earlier work on the asymmetric stock return patterns around option grants focus on managers influencing their stock option compensation by manipulating the timing of the grants and the timing of corporate information disclosures. Yermack (1997) shows that stock option awards between 1992 and 1994 were often followed by positive abnormal returns. He interprets the results as evidence that CEOs opportunistically time option awards before the disclosure of favorable corporate news 1 . Aboody and Kasznik (2000) investigate voluntary disclosures around scheduled option grants from 1992 to 1996 and find evidence consistent with managers timing their information release by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news. 2 More recently, Lie (2005) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) propose the backdating explanation, i.e., managers set the option grant date retroactively to an earlier date when the stock price was lower than on the date when the option was awarded. Backdating has attracted a great amount of attention from the media, regulators, and investors (e.g., Maremont 2005; Cox 2006; Forelle and Bandler 2006; Stecklow 2006 ) and has inspired many academic studies examining the scandal from various perspectives 3 , including the link between backdating and corporate governance (Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer 2009; Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby 2009; Collins, Gong, and Li 2009) , the economic impact of backdating (Narayanan, Schipani, and Seyhun 2007; Cheng, Crabtree, and Smith 2008; Bernile and Jarrell 2009) , the prevalence of backdating Lie 2007, 2009; Narayanan and Seyhun 2008; Bebchuk et al.. 2009) , and the backdating of stock option exercises (e.g., Cicero 2006; Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Heitzman 2009) . 1 The practice of granting an option before the release of positive corporate news is often referred to as springloading. Another practice, called bullet-dodging, is the practice of delaying a grant until after the negative news has been released. 2 Heron and Lie (2007) shows that when the definition of scheduled option grants is tightened the trough pattern of stock price largely disappears. 3 Lie was listed as a Time 100 and also awarded the notable contribution to accounting literature for his finding of backdating.
Regulators have been continuously responding to these opportunistic behaviors and introducing different disclosure rules. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, effective August 29, 2002, managers are required to report to the SEC within two business days the receipt of option grants in Form 4 while in the pre-SOX period managers can report grants on the 10 th day of the month following the grants (Form 4) or within 45 days after the firm's fiscal year end (Form 5) . This shortened reporting window is expected to significantly increase the transparency of option grants and reduce the possibility of management strategic behaviors. However, Lie (2007, 2009) continue to document the mitigated but persistent abnormal returns around option grants in the post-SOX period. Once backdating becomes more difficult after the enactment of SOX, would managers resort to other forms of manipulation such as opportunistic timing of corporate disclosures around option grants or vise versa? This is an unanswered question. In addition, since Lie (2005) presented the first evidence on option grant backdating, the SEC and the Department of Justice have implicated nearly 200 firms (Forelle and Scannell 2006) . In response to the widespread revelation of fraudulent stock option practices, the SEC adopted a set of new disclosure rules on executive compensation in December 2006. It is unclear how SOX and the subsequent disclosure regulations affect the interplay of these opportunistic behaviors related to stock option grants. The issue is of importance to regulators and investors and has generated growing concerns as to the effectiveness of the regulations.
[Insert Table 1 here] Table 1 presents the timeline of our sample periods and the three managerial actions related to option grants that have been identified in the literature. We partition the entire sample period from January 1996 to December 2008 into three periods: pre-SOX, post-SOX, and post-Scandal.
We highlight the possibility of each opportunistic behavior in each period. We hypothesize that while backdating is largely eliminated, the other two behaviors remain in the post-SOX and post-Scandal periods. In our main analysis, we conduct three sets of analyses to test this hypothesis.
First, we examine the difference in returns in the 30 trading-day window before and after scheduled and unscheduled option grants in all three periods. We do not observe a statistically significant return difference for scheduled option grants. This is consistent with the finding in Heron and Lie (2007) . Following Bebchuk et al. (2009) , we identify a set of option grants as Lucky option grants, which is defined as those options awarded on the day with the lowest stock price within the grant month. Lucky grants are most likely to be the backdated grants. 4 For
Unlucky unscheduled option grants, we find that the asymmetric stock return pattern around grant dates are persistent in both post-SOX and post-Scandal periods, suggesting that the opportunistic timing practice still exists.
Second, we examine whether the market asymmetrically responds to several common corporate events occurring within the quarter of the option grants. These corporate disclosures include earnings announcements, conference calls, management forecasts, and M&A announcements. We find that for scheduled option grants the three-day market response to information events occurring before the grants is the same as the reponse to those events occurring after the grants in all three periods. In contrast, for Unlucky unscheduled option grants in the post-SOX period, these corporate events are likely to be bad news (i.e., negative market response) before grant dates and good news (i.e., positive market response) after grant dates. The evidence suggests that managers either time option grants in alignment with various news events or time the news events themselves.
Third, to further explore the timing practice, we compare stock options awarded to CEOs with those awarded to independent directors. Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that directors also 4 The logic is that it is possible to time the grant date on one of the days with low price but it is highly unlikely that managers can award a grant exactly on the day with the lowest price.
receive Lucky grants, suggesting that backdating is prevalent among director grants. Their study leads us to ask whether directors could still entrench themselves through the timing practice of option grants once the backdating practice is no longer viable. We argue that independent directors have less influence on or control over the timing of corporate disclosures; hence, we expect that the timing of option grants in alignment with news disclosures is less severe for stock options awarded to independent directors. The result provides support for our expectation -in contrast to CEO option grants, for director grants, we find no evidence of bad (good) news before (after) the grants for director grants.
In additional analysis, we take advantage of a natural setting in quarterly earnings announcements; namely, some announcement dates are fixed while others are variable. We show that there exists return differences between the half quarter before and after option grant dates for both fixed and variable earnings announcements. However, the difference is higher in the quarters with variable earnings announcements. This result indicates that variability of earnings announcement dates gives managers more flexibility to engage in the timing practice to their advantage, which generates stronger abnormal returns than those associated with fixed announcement dates.
Finally, to further understand the consequence of timing manipulation associated with option grants, we conduct additional analysis and find that investors can extract information from option grant signals and earn 5.6% (2.3%) abnormal returns on a portfolio formed and held for three months following the grants in the post-SOX (post-Scandal) period. We interpret the result as evidence that opportunistic timing behavior in the post-SOX period has significant economic consequences. We cautiously interpret the decreasing magnitude in the post-Scandal period as evidence that increased public scrutiny and transparency during this period have effectively deterred the opportunities for executive enrichment associated with option grants.
Taken together, our findings strongly suggest that both types of timing behaviorsopportunistic timing of option grants relative to future stock returns and timing of corporate disclosures around option grants -continue to exist in the post-SOX period. These timing practices have significant economic consequences and were not mitigated until after the revelation of the backdating scandal.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on executive compensation and corporate disclosures. First, our study adds to our understanding of the managerial incentives for stock option malpractices and highlights the regulatory effect on these behaviors. While several recent studies (e.g., Lie 2007, 2009; Narayanan and Seyhun 2008) conclude that backdating was mitigated effectively by SOX after 2002, our study is the first to document that SOX does not seem to have curtailed the opportunities for managers to game the timing of option grants and corporate disclosures. Second, using the unique setting of fixed and variable earnings announcement dates, we document that managers time the release of news events related to unscheduled option grants. Thus, our study complements Aboody and Kasznik (2000) that shows the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures for scheduled grants. Third, our study also extends Bebchuk et al. (2009) by documenting that opportunistic timing does not exist for director option grants. Our result may partially explain why the trough pattern of stock returns around director grants is much less prevalent than that of CEO option grants. Finally, our results indicate that the incidence of timing manipulation affects the true inference of the prevalence of backdating both pre-and post-SOX. Once backdating becomes less likely, managers turn to opportunistic timing. The effect of opportunistic timing is economically significant.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and sample.
Sections 3 outlines the research design and presents the primary findings. Section 4 and 5 provide additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.
Data and Sample Selection
We focus our analysis on CEOs because they have significant influence over firms' stock option practices and disclosure policies. In additional analysis, we also investigate option grant behaviors for independent directors as a benchmark against those for CEOs. To that end, we apply the same screening procedure described above to extract the option grants to independent directors, who are identified in the Thomson Financial database as directors (role code D) and not defined as having any other roles in the firms.
5 Aboody and Kasznik (2000) categorize a grant as scheduled if it occurs within a one-week anniversary of a prior grant. lie (2007, 2009 ) have detailed discussion of using one-day versus one-week window as the classification criteria for scheduled and unscheduled grants. Our classification scheme is similar to that employed in Heron and Lie (2007) that classifies a grant as scheduled if it is dated within one-day of the one-year anniversary of a prior grant. Besides this scheme, Heron and Lie (2009) also use a second scheme that classifies a grant as scheduled if it is followed by a grant that is dated within one-day of the one-year anniversary of a prior grant. Thus, the unscheduled grants classified in our paper might capture some scheduled grants by Heron and Lie's second scheme. This would not be a concern since it works against our findings. Table 2 presents the monthly distribution of unscheduled and scheduled CEO option grants for the three subsample periods. In general, the frequency of grants at the beginning of the calendar year is greater than that in the rest of the year. There is no significant difference between award time of unscheduled and scheduled grants except that scheduled grants also appear to be frequent in May, following the usual annual board meeting time. We do not find any significant changes in the distributions over the three sample periods. However, the percentage of scheduled option grants increases over time, calculated as 8.8%, 11.3%, and 12.3% in the pre-SOX, post-SOX, and post-Scandal periods, respectively.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Empirical Analysis
Prior studies document three explanations for the abnormal stock return patterns around CEO option grants: (1) the opportunistic timing of option grants (Yermack 1997) , (2) the opportunistic timing of corporate news disclosures (Aboody and Kasznik 2000) , and (3) the backdating of option grants (Lie 2005; Narayanan and Seyhun 2008) . Heron and Lie (2007) conclude that the new two-day filing requirement under SOX has effectively curtailed option backdating. However, their study does not explicitly isolate backdating from other forms of grant manipulation; it is, therefore, difficult to assess whether managers continue to exercise their discretion and influence to strategically grant stock options after SOX. We attempt to provide insights into these issues. We begin by investigating stock returns around scheduled and unscheduled option grants in Section 3.1. We separate Lucky and Unlucky option grants in an attempt to examine to what extent the three types of opportunistic behaviors are affected by regulatory changes across the sample period. In Section 3.2, we examine managerial choices of timing important corporate news events such as earnings announcements, conference calls, management forecasts, and merger and acquisition (M&As) announcements. This analysis rests on the assumption that managers have inside information about the nature (i.e., good or bad news) of these events and thus can game the timing of the news release or/and option grants. 6 Finally, in Section 3.3, we extend our analysis to option grants to independent directors. Bebchuk et al. (2009) identify an association between backdated option grants to directors and those to CEOs, suggesting that these directors indeed benefit from firms' backdating practice. A natural question to ask is: Do independent directors benefit from alternative timing -timing (unscheduled) grants relative to news disclosures, timing disclosures around option grants, or both? The answer to this question adds to our understanding of the circumstances under which each type of opportunistic behavior is more likely to occur. Although directors generally have inside information on the nature of the news events, they may have less control over the precise timing of news release. Thus, we argue that lacking foreknowledge of such timing makes it difficult for directors to time their option grants to align with news disclosure, much less timing the disclosure itself around option grants.
Tests on Stock Returns around Option Grants
The purpose of the stock return test is to document whether the trough pattern of stock returns around grant date exists and persists in the post-SOX and post-Scandal periods. The analysis is applied to Lucky and Unlucky, scheduled and unscheduled groups separately because the abnormal return pattern around the grant date, if any, could be driven by different forces for different grants. First of all, for scheduled option grants, neither backdating nor opportunistic timing of option grants is likely to occur, and any Lucky scheduled grant is simply a result of random selection. Second, for Unlucky scheduled grants, the abnormal pattern of stock returns around the grant date can be attributed to the opportunistic timing of news disclosures. Third, for unscheduled option grants, all three explanations for the abnormal return pattern could be 6 For M&A events, we only consider those firms who are the acquirers.
possible in the pre-SOX period; whereas in the post-SOX and post-Scandal periods, backdating is largely eliminated and hence only the two timing explanations are possible. Table 1 presents the details of the possibility of each opportunistic behavior under different scenarios. The four cells in the bottom right corner -the overlap of the last two columns and last two rows -are the focus of our analysis.
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 3 presents the results. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for the window of 30 trading days before and after the option grant date. The abnormal returns are the difference between raw returns and value-weighted market returns. In the absence of backdating or opportunistic timing of option grants and news disclosures, there should be no statistical difference between the cumulative abnormal returns in the window from day -30 to day -1, CAR(-30, -1), and those in the window from day 1 to day 30, CAR(1, 30), where day 0 is the option grant date. 7 We find that the number of Lucky scheduled option grants is very small, accounting for only about 4.9-6.8% of scheduled grants. This percentage range is close to 4.5%, the random probability of a grant being lucky assuming 22 trading days in a month. Given the definition of Lucky scheduled option grants, it is not surprising to observe negative (positive) abnormal returns before (after) this type of grant. However, for Unlucky scheduled option grants, we find no difference between CAR (1, 30) and CAR(-30,-1) in all three sample periods. This finding indicates that the timing of corporate news events is not significant for scheduled grants in our sample period, which is consistent with the assertion in Heron and Lie (2007) that once scheduled option grants are redefined as one day instead of one week before or after the grant in 7 Heron and Lie (2009) calculate the difference using raw returns. Under the assumption that the difference should be centered on zero, they are able to infer the fraction of option grants that are backdated or manipulated. We use the difference in CAR to further take care of the effect of return seasonality-for example, the January effect. This control is important because February is the month with the largest number of option grants. We also exclude day 0, the option grant date, in return comparison. All results are robust when we replace day (-30,-1) with day (-29, 0) . the prior year, the abnormal returns largely disappear. This conclusion is further supported by our test based on the timing of corporate news events in the next subsection 3.2.
The results for unscheduled grants, shown in the last three columns of Table 3 , reveal several interesting patterns. First, the percentage of Lucky unscheduled grants decreases monotonically from 11.5% pre-SOX to 5.1% post-Scandal. Second, the difference between CAR
(1, 30) and CAR (-30,-1) in all three sample periods is significant for Unlucky grants, although the magnitude decreases from 6.78% pre-SOX to 1.50% post-Scandal. This finding suggests that the trough pattern of stock returns is most prevalent before SOX, possibly driven by all three types of timing games. Under the tightened reporting requirement of SOX, backdating is presumed to largely disappear, especially after the revelation of backdating practice, the subsequent investigations launched by the SEC and the U.S. Justice Department, and the introduction of new disclosure rules. Hence, we can attribute the significant difference in returns in the post-Scandal period to opportunistic timing of either option grants or corporate events.
In summary, our evidence confirms prior findings which show that SOX regulation curbs the opportunity for backdating. However, more importantly, it also suggests that, after SOX, executives are still tempted to manipulate the timing of either grant dates or corporate disclosures associated with the unscheduled option grants.
Timing of Option Grants and Corporate News Events
A necessary condition for the opportunistic timing hypothesis is that bad news usually precedes option grants and/or good news follows option grants. In this subsection, we investigate how CEOs strategically align the option grant date with announcements of several corporate events that are shown to have affected stock returns and are available in public databases (Ecker, Francis, Olsson, and Schipper 2006) . These events include: (1) earnings announcements, (2) conference calls, (3) management forecasts, and (4) mergers & acquisitions (M&A).
Specifically, we examine whether firms grant options before (after) good (bad) news. We use three-day cumulative abnormal returns (denoted as CAR3d) around the event dates to classify whether a specific event is good or bad news. We conjecture that if firms time option grants strategically to increase potential option value, the likelihood of observing good news (positive CAR3d) after the option grants would be higher than that before the grants. Thus, the CAR3d for the events in the half quarter after the option grants is expected to be higher than that in the half quarter before option grants. We examine the above prediction for each type of corporate events.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Panel A of Table 4 presents the difference in CAR3d between the two windows. The finding for scheduled grants is straight forward -the market responses to various news events disclosed in the half quarter after option grants are not significantly stronger than those disclosed before option grants; except for M&A announcements in the post-SOX period, which is significant at 0.1 level. 8 Given that it is unlikely for firms to manipulate grant dates (through either backdating or timing) for scheduled option grants, the no difference result supports the assertion that in the sample period we examine from 1996 to 2008, the timing of corporate news events is not significant for scheduled grants, consistent with the finding in Heron and Lie (2007) .
In contrast, we find strong evidence of such opportunistic behavior for unscheduled grants.
The last three columns of Table 4 , Panel A show that, in both pre-SOX and post-SOX periods, the news disclosed is negative in the half quarter before option grant dates and positive afterward, 9 with the difference in CAR3d being significantly positive for all four events. Note that this difference becomes indistinguishable from zero in the post-Scandal period, except for conference calls which is still marginally significant. The collective evidence from unscheduled grants suggest that firms time option grants in response to important corporate events in a strategic manner in both the pre-and post-SOX periods. The results are, thus, consistent with our view that SOX regulations do not curtail the strategic timing of option grants or timing of news events.
In theory, under the SEC's rule of two-day filing requirement introduced in SOX, it is almost impossible to backdate option grants for such a short look-back period. However, Heron and Lie (2007) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) find some evidence that that it took more than two business days for some firms to file their option grants with the SEC. They suggest that backdating may continue in the post-SOX period among some firms. 10 To further explore the regulatory effect on firms' grant behavior, we separate unscheduled option grants into Lucky and
Unlucky grant groups and test whether the pattern we observe in Panel A of Table 4 immediate implication for our analysis is that, if the difference in market response to news events is still significant for Unlucky unscheduled grants, it should be produced by timing behaviors.
Panel B of Table 4 presents our analysis. Indeed, the last three columns show that the differential market responses persist among Unlucky unscheduled option grants for both the pre-and post-SOX periods, supporting the timing hypothesis. Interestingly, for Lucky unscheduled option grants, the pattern extends even into the post-Scandal period. The evidence suggests that, for a small number of option grants falling into the days with the lowest stock price within a month, the timing of grants or information events emerge. The pattern is robust across all three sample periods, but the number of such grants decreases.
Option Grants to Independent Directors
The opportunistic timing hypothesis requires that option grant recipients have significant influence and control over when to release corporate news, which will then enable them to time the information release relative to option grants, or to align the grants with information release.
To the extent that independent directors are outsiders of the firm, they do not exercise control over operating activities such as news releases. Thus, we expect that it is less likely to find evidence in supporting timing hypothesis for the grants awarded to independent directors. As a benchmark analysis, we analyze independent director grants in this subsection to contrast those with CEO grants in Section 3.2.
[Insert Figure 1 here] Figure 1 presents the cumulative abnormal returns in the month before and after grant dates for unscheduled option grants. Visual examination indicates the evidence is largely consistent with our expectations: in the pre-SOX period, the trough pattern for CEO is stronger than that for directors; in the post-SOX period, the dip is still observable for CEO grants but is no longer observable for director grants; in the post-Scandal period, the returns following CEO grants show an upward trend while the returns following director grants remain flat.
[Insert Table 5 here]
To gain additional insight, we repeat our analysis described in Section 3.2 for director grants. Table 5 presents the results. The first five columns report the results for scheduled option grants. Consistent with the results from scheduled option grants for CEOs, we do not find supporting evidence that the disclosures preceding (following) scheduled grants contain bad (good) news. Of 12 event-periods, only two show the significant difference in CAR3d, including the one with negative difference (-1.17%). The last column of Table 5 provides evidence consistent with our expectations for Unlucky unscheduled grants -that is, timing behaviors do not exist for option grants to independent directors. The difference in CAR3d is significant only for management forecasts in the pre-SOX and for M&A in the post-Scandal period. This finding is in contrast to the results presented in the last column of Panel B of Table 4 , which shows that, for all eight event periods in the pre-and post-SOX periods, there is a significant difference in CAR3d.
In sum, our analysis has thus far suggested that, in the pre-and post-SOX periods, timing practice with respect to option grants or corporate events is prevalent for unscheduled grants to CEOs but cannot be identified for unscheduled grants to independent directors. Thus, our findings extend those in Bebchuk et al. (2009) that backdating exists for both groups.
Additional Tests
The analysis in the preceding section documents that (i) there is no obvious evidence supporting the behavior of timing corporate events for scheduled option grants in all three periods; and (ii) timing of option grants or corporate events exists among unscheduled option grants in the post-SOX period but largely weakened in the post-Scandal period. However, our analyses thus far do not distinguish the timing of option grants from the timing of corporate events. Our next step is to conduct two further analyses on unscheduled CEO option grants to shed light on which type of timing is more likely to occur in our sample period. In Section 4.1, we use the feature of fixed versus variable earnings announcement dates to further distinguish the timing of information events from the timing of option grants. In Section 4.2, we examine the relation between backdating and opportunistic timing in a multivariate regression model that controls for variables associated with the likelihood of backdating.
Earnings Announcement Based Tests for Unscheduled Option Grants
In order to distinguish the timing of option grants from the timing of information events, we need to identify a setting where the announcement time of information events is fixed [Insert Table 6 here]
We match each unscheduled option grant with the closest quarterly earnings announcement (either fixed or variable) and examine the difference between CAR (-30,-1) and CAR (1, 30), where day 0 is the option grant date. Panel A of Table 6 presents the results.
Several observations are note worthy. Although for both types of earnings announcements in all three periods the difference between CAR (-30,-1) and CAR (1, 30) is statistically significant, there are significant differences across different groups and over time. The difference is the largest in the pre-SOX period, with 7.8% and 10.50% for the quarters with fixed and variable earnings announcements, respectively. For the quarters with variable earnings announcement, executives can strategically time earnings announcements to accommodate the option grant or simply backdate the grants; hence it is not surprising that the difference in CAR is 2.7% higher than that in the quarters with fixed earnings announcements. This pattern persists in the post-SOX and post-Scandal periods -the difference in CAR between fixed and variable earnings announcement quarters is 1.55% and 2.62% in the post-SOX and post-Scandal period, respectively. In these two periods, particularly the latter, backdating is highly unlikely. Thus, the difference is CAR for fixed earnings announcements is primarily driven by the timing of option grants, while the difference in CAR for variable earnings announcements is jointly driven by the timing of option grants and earnings announcements.
11
In sum, the evidence presented in Panel A of Table 6 suggests that: first, the timing of option grants and the timing of corporate events jointly exist among unscheduled CEO option grants; second, these practices persist in the post-Scandal period; and finally, these practices are more prevalent when event dates for corporate disclosure are variable.
We further explore whether the market responses to earnings announcements before and after option grants are different. Panel B of Table 6 shows that there is a significant difference in CAR3d in the pre-SOX period for both fixed and variable earnings announcements. However, the difference disappears in the post-SOX period but again shows up in post-Scandal period for fixed earnings announcements (0.83%). While it is premature to conclude that the timing of option grants dominates in the post-Scandal period, the evidence is at least consistent with previous findings that the timing hypothesis persists after backdating is eliminated.
Multivariate Analysis of Lucky Grants
Following Bubchuk et al. (2009), we use an important assumption; namely, that Lucky grants proxy for backdated grants in our main tests. In this subsection, we conduct multivariate 11 Using the post-Scandal period as the example, 1.03% is the effect of timing of option grants which is significant by itself, while 3.65% is the joint effect of timing of option grants and timing of the earnings announcements.
analysis to seek further support for this assumption. In particular, we are interested in testing 
where LuckyGrants = indicator variable, -1‖ for option grants awarded on the day with the lowest stock price within the month, and -0‖ otherwise. would expect an insignificant relation between Lucky grants and these information events. In particular, when the opportunities for backdating are significantly reduced and firms resort instead to the timing manipulation via grants dates or information events, option grant dates should be less likely to systematically fall into the days with the lowest stock prices.
[Insert Table 7 here] Table 7 highlights the predictions (column 2) and presents the results from the logistic regression. In the pre-SOX period, the results are consistent with all the predictions. In the post-SOX period, Schedule and FirmSize variables are no longer significant, but Volatility and WSJ firms variables remain significant. The significant WSJ firms variable is consistent with the argument in Heron and Lie (2007) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) that backdating was mitigated but was not completely eliminated after SOX. However, this variable is no longer significant in the post-Scandal period, supporting the view that backdating was eliminated due to the public revelation of the scandal and the implementation of new compensation disclosure rules. In the post-Scandal period, Schedule is marginally significant. Volatility is significant but in opposite sign, suggesting that option grants are less likely to fall into the days with the lowest stock price for high volatility firms.
Turning to the three voluntary disclosure events and examining the association of these events with Lucky grants, we find several interesting patterns. More specifically, the coefficient on Conference Call is significantly negative across all three sample periods, suggesting that Overall, the evidence presented in this subsection gives us further support that the Lucky grants dummy variable used in this paper effectively captures option grants that are attributed to backdating. Hence, the separation of Lucky and Unlucky grants provides us a reasonable benchmark to distinguish the backdating hypothesis from the timing hypothesis.
Economic Impact of Option Grant Signals
While we have demonstrated that the opportunistic timing of option grants or corporate disclosures persists in the post-SOX period, an important question remains: Does the opportunistic timing have any significant economic consequence? 14 To answer the question, we examine whether investors could earn abnormal returns had they learned about the option grants.
In the pre-SOX period, executives receiving option grants could report to the SEC in either Form 4, which was due on the 10 th day of the month following the grants, or Form 5, which was not due until 45 days after the firm's fiscal year end. With such a long reporting window, it would be difficult for investors to use the grant dates to make abnormal profit. However, the new two-day filing rule under SOX allows investors to learn about the option grants in a timely manner.
Consequently, the timing of option grants may signal abnormally high stock returns in the period subsequent to the date of option grants or the date of SEC filing. We test whether investors can earn a significant alpha from a portfolio formed on option grant signals after controlling for Fama-French three factors (Fama and French 1992) and Carhart momentum factor (Carhart 1997 ). To reduce the dilution effect of scheduled option grants, we focus on unscheduled grants. 15 Two portfolios are formed -one is formed on the day following the grants and the other formed on the next day of the SEC filings. This separation is motivated by the fact that investors only learn about the grants after insiders file the transactions to the SEC. There may be abnormal returns between option grant dates and the SEC filing dates, particularly for those grants violating the 2-day SEC filing rule. Both portfolios are held for three months.
[Insert Table 8 here] Table 8 presents the results from the calendar-time Fama-French-Carhart four-factor regressions. For the portfolio formed after the option grant dates, the alpha (daily abnormal returns) is significantly positive at 9.4 and 3.8 basis points, respectively, in the post-SOX and post-Scandal periods. In other words, investors can earn approximately 5.6% and 2.3% abnormal returns within three months following the option grants in the two periods. The signs for other factors are as expected. However, for the portfolio formed and held for three months starting the day following the SEC filing, the alpha is no longer significant. The difference in alpha between the two portfolios held for different windows suggests that, in the short period between the option grant date and the SEC filing date, there are significant abnormal returns. Thus, our finding complements the analyses in Heron and Lie (2007) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) which show that a few firms violate the two-day filing rule due to the practice of backdating or opportunistic timing.
Since Lie (2005) Table 8 , we infer that investors can no longer profit from option grants after the scandal and the introduction of new disclosure rules. We interpret these results, 16 For details of the final rule, see the SEC's website at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf.
together with the findings in previous sections, as evidence that increased transparency and public scrutiny following the scandal and the new disclosure rules curb executives' willingness to engage in these opportunistic behaviors.
Concluding Remarks
Prior studies attribute the asymmetric trough patterns of stock returns around option grant dates to three types of managerial behaviors: (1) focus on the timing explanations. Our analysis has established that the timing of option grants and the timing of information events persist not only after SOX but also after the revelation of the scandal. This makes our study unique among other recent studies that attribute the pattern of stock returns around option grant dates post-SOX to the option grant dating game. We find no opportunistic timing for scheduled option grants in our sample period, but both types of timing exist for unscheduled option grants.
Our study contributes to the executive compensation literature by providing new evidence on how CEOs strategically behave to increase personal gains from their stock option compensation. While we do not directly investigate to what extent these manipulation activities destroy shareholder value, our findings suggest that investors could have earned abnormal returns by holding the portfolio for three months following option grants in the post-SOX period.
We contribute also to the disclosure literature by highlighting the effect of regulatory restrictions on corporate disclosure behavior and executive stock option practice. Our findings suggest that SOX cannot stop executives from strategically reporting bad news before the option grant date and good news afterward. However, the timing manipulation has recently been mitigated by the increased public scrutiny and new compensation disclosure rules.
A caveat of our analysis for the post-backdating-scandal period is that the effect of new disclosure rules may be confounded by corporate climate change resulting from the backdating scandal. While we caution our readers that whether this effect is temporary or permanent warrants further attention, we conclude that the new disclosures rules, combined with the tightened public scrutiny, have achieved what SOX regulations did not achieve in terms of discouraging top management's opportunistic timing behaviors. 
TABLE 3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Option Grant Dates
The table shows the cumulative abnormal returns around option grant dates for scheduled and unscheduled grants in the three periods, pre-SOX, post-SOX, and Post-Scandal. For each period, grants are further categorized as Lucky and Unlucky grants. Grants are defined as Lucky if they are awarded on the date with the lowest stock price within the month, and Unlucky otherwise. CAR 30) are the cumulative abnormal returns in the 30-trading-day window before and after option grant date, respectively, where day 0 is the grant date. Abnormal returns (in percentage) are calculated as the difference between raw returns and value-weighted market returns. Scheduled option grants are those granted either within one day of the one-year anniversary of prior grants or within one day of annual board meeting date (Heron and Lie 2007; Bebchuk et al. 2009 (-30,-1) and CAR (1, 30) are the cumulative abnormal returns in the 30-trading-day window before and after option grant date, which is day 0, respectively. Panel B presents the three-day cumulative abnormal returns (in percentage) around fixed and variable earnings announcements disclosed within the windows of half quarter before and after option grant date. ** and *** indicate the difference is statistically significant at 0.05 and 0.01 (two-tailed) levels, respectively. 
TABLE 8 Portfolio Analysis
The table presents calendar-time Fama-French-Carhart four-factor regressions for the portfolio formed on the next day following either the option grant date or the SEC filing date. The portfolios were held for three months. The dependent variable is the portfolio equal-weighted daily excess return, over the risk-free rate. MKT, SML, HML and UMD are the market, size, book-to-market, momentum factors, respectively (Fama and French 1993; Carhart 1997 
